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What Does Graham Mean in Michigan?
by Kimberly A. Thomas, Clinical Professor, University of Michigan Law School

Introduction
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme
Court held that life without parole could not be
imposed on a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide
crime.1 In this context, the Graham Court extensively
discussed the diminished culpability of juvenile criminal defendants, as compared to adults. The Court relied on current scientific research regarding adolescent
development and neuroscience. While the narrowest
holding of Graham has little impact in Michigan, the
science it relies on, and the potential broader implications for adolescents in Michigan, are significant.
Graham Summary
Terrance Graham, was 16 years old when he and
three other youths attempted to rob a restaurant and
one of Graham’s accomplices hit the manager in the
head with a metal bar.2 Graham was charged, as an
adult, with armed burglary with assault or battery,
a first-degree felony with a maximum penalty of
life without parole, as well as with attempted armed
robbery, and he pleaded guilty to both offenses. 3 At
his sentencing hearing, Graham stated that it was his
“first and last time getting in trouble,” and that he
“made a promise to God and myself that if I get a
second chance, I’m going to do whatever it takes to
get to the [National Football League].”4 Graham was
sentenced to 3 years of probation, with the first 12
months served in jail.
While on probation, Graham was arrested again
after a high speed chase with police; this time for a
home invasion robbery that allegedly occurred about
one month before his 18th birthday. At his violation
of probation hearing on the burglary case, Graham
denied involvement in the robbery, but admitted
violating probation by fleeing police.5 At the hearing,
the state also presented evidence about the robbery,
including victim testimony. Although the presentence
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investigation report recommended a sentence of 4
years and the prosecution recommended 30 years, the
judge, who was not the original judge on the case,
sentenced him to the maximum sentence available –
life without parole.6
The Graham Court distilled two strands of Eighth
Amendment cases addressing the proportionality
of sentences: cases challenging “the length of termof-years sentences given all the circumstances in a
particular case” and cases “in which the Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death penalty.”7 In the first
line of cases,8 the Court considers the circumstances
of the cases to, first, compare the gravity of the offense
and the severity of the penalty. “ ‘[I]n the rare case
in which [this] threshold comparison . . . leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality’ the court should
then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same
crime in other jurisdictions.”9 In the second class of
cases, which, until Graham, had involved only death
penalty cases, the Court had used categorical rules to
evaluate the nature of the offense10 and characteristics
of the offender.11 In these cases, the Court “first considers ‘objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice’ to
determine whether there is national consensus against
the sentencing practice at issue . . . [then], guided by
‘the standards elaborated by controlling precedents
and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose,’ the Court must determine in the
exercise of its own independent judgment whether the
punishment in question violates the Constitution.”12
The Court determined that Graham’s case, despite
not involving the death penalty, fit in the second
class of cases because it involved a challenge to a
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“sentencing practice” as applied to a “class of offenders
who have committed a range of crimes.”
The Court found that although 37 states permit
life without parole for non-homicide juvenile offenders in some circumstances, actual sentencing practice
showed a consensus against the imposition of life
without parole in these cases.13 Though many states
have moved to make it easier to prosecute juveniles in
adult court instead of juvenile court, the Court was
not persuaded that this showed that states intended to
give life without parole sentences to these offenders.14
Second, the Court exercised its “independent
judgment” to consider the “culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics,
along with the severity of the punishment,” including
an inquiry into whether the sentence serves legitimate
penological goals. As for the offenders, the Court
stated that Roper “established that because juveniles
have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the
most severe punishments.”15 The Court approvingly
cited modern brain science, discussed in Roper, which
shows “fundamental differences between juvenile
and adult minds” including the fact that “parts of the
brain involved in behavior control continue to mature
through late adolescence.”16
As to the nature of the offenses, the Court said
that it “has recognized that defendants who do not
kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are
categorically less deserving of the most serious forms
of punishment than are murderers.”17 Therefore, juveniles who do not kill or intend to kill have “twice diminished moral culpability.”18 The Court also found
that the severity of the sentence was significant – it
is “irrevocable” and “deprives the convict of the most
basic liberties without giving hope of restoration.”19
Finally, the Court found that the sentence lacked any
penological justification, as it was disproportionate
to the goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation
or rehabilitation when imposed on a juvenile for a
nonhomicide offense.20
The Court rejected a non-categorical approach
as inadequate. It determined that a categorical rule
would allow all of the relevant juveniles a chance to
show their “maturity and reform” through parole eligibility.21 A categorical rule also better avoids the difficulty encountered by juvenile advocates and courts
when considering the culpability of a youth who has
committed a particularly brutal crime.22



Adolescents in Michigan Sentenced to Life
Without Parole
Graham’s narrow holding on non-homicide offenses will have almost no impact in Michigan; more
broadly, however, Graham may result in greater
challenges to the sentence of life without parole by
the unusually high number of juveniles in Michigan
given this sentence. It may also result in challenges to
extremely long term-of-years sentences for juveniles
for non-homicide offenses.
In Michigan, prior to Graham, it was hypothetically possible for a 17 year-old to be sentenced to life
without parole for an offense that did not involve a
death. Under the sentencing provisions for criminal
sexual conduct in the first-degree against a person under 13, there is a the mandatory sentence of life without parole for someone who was previously convicted
of a criminal sexual conduct offense against someone
under 13 years old.23 According to the study cited by
the Graham court, no juveniles are serving sentences
under this provision.24
Approximately 350 individuals are serving life
without parole in Michigan for homicide crimes
committed when they were a juvenile. These persons
received a life without parole sentence for crimes committed under 18 years old because they were either 17
years old and, therefore, considered an adult under
Michigan law, 25 or were 16 or under, but were tried
and sentenced like an adult. Adolescents can be tried
and given an adult sentence if cases are directly filed
by the prosecution in adult circuit court,26 the juvenile
is tried and sentenced as an adult in family court, 27
or if the case is waived by a judge into adult court.28
When tried in adult court, if the juvenile is convicted
of first-degree murder the sentence is automatically
life without parole.29
Some of these persons serving life without parole
were juveniles who were not directly responsible for
causing a death. For example, under an aiding and
abetting theory, someone can even be held responsible for “those crimes that are the natural and probable consequences of the offense he intends to aid or
abet.”30 For felony murder liability, a defendant may
intend to be the getaway driver for a robbery, yet can
be convicted of murder if the defendant committed acts that assisted the commission of the killing,
had “the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to
create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with
3
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knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the
probable result . . . while committing, attempting to
commit, or assisting in the commission of the predicate felony.”31
Impact of Graham on the Sentence of Life
Without Parole for Juveniles in Michigan
Challenges to Life Without Parole for Juveniles
under Graham

Broadly, the Graham Court reaffirmed that “[t]
he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth
Amendment.”32 The Court also raised the hopes of
those opposed to life without parole for juveniles
through in its discussion of the lesser culpability of
juveniles. The Court also did this by focusing, in
some parts of the opinion, on offenders “who did not
kill or intend to kill,” suggesting that juveniles who
did not commit the act or intend to commit the act
also may not constitutionally receive the sentence of
life without parole.
Litigation following Graham33 will more clearly
determine the meaning of the Court’s language, but
for now both a categorical and a case-by-case approach
to challenges to juvenile sentences remain viable.
Under Graham, a defendant who makes a broad challenge to the unconstitutionality of a sentence for a
particular offense (such as felony murder) or class of
offenders (such as 14-year olds) should take the same
approach as the Graham majority. However, nothing
in the Court’s opinion eliminated an Eighth Amendment challenge to life without parole for a particular
juvenile charged or convicted of homicide. The
Court’s analysis suggests that such a challenge should
be brought under the “gross proportionality” test,
as in Solem v. Helm34 and Harmelin v. Michigan,35
previously applied to term of years challenges. Therefore, at this point, courts can expect to see Eighth
Amendment challenges that both raise categorical
challenges to the sentence of life without parole under
the Graham analysis, and raise individual challenges to
the proportionality of the sentence for the particular
juvenile under the more traditional “gross proportionality” standard.
The constitutionality could be litigated at the time
of a waiver hearing,36 during sentencing when the
court is deciding whether to sentence as an adult or as
a juvenile,37 at sentencing in a direct file case, or the
4

case of a 17 year old in adult court. Parties should
anticipate that counsel for the juvenile may submit
expert affidavits, records, scientific information or
articles, or other documents to support the motion.
An evidentiary hearing, where counsel can present
evidence or testimony may be helpful to making a full
record of the facts and law considered by the court.
Challenges to Juvenile Life Without Parole Under
the Michigan Constitution

In light of Graham, the sentence of life without
parole for any juvenile may also fail under the broader
protections of the Michigan constitution. Our constitution provides that “cruel or unusual punishment
shall not be inflicted.”38 Though the language of this
provision is similar to the Eighth Amendment, Michigan courts have given greater protection under its
“cruel or unusual punishment” clause.39 The greater
protection results, in part, from the differences in the
constitutional texts.40 The state provision, banning
“cruel or unusual punishment” rather than the “cruel
and unusual punishments” of the Eighth Amendment, “necessarily encompass[es] a broader sweep” of
disallowed punishments.41 A punishment need not
be both cruel and unusual to violate the state constitution; falling within one of these categories will suffice.42 Additionally, the distinct history of Michigan’s
constitution and the weight of case law in the state
support a broader reading of the state provision.43
As a result of this distinct history, language, and case
law, to determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual
“requires consideration of the gravity of the offense, the
harshness of the penalty, a comparison of the penalty to
penalties for other crimes in this state, a comparison of
the penalty to penalties imposed for the same offense in
other states, and the goal of rehabilitation.”44
The first prong weighs the gravity of the offense
against the severity of the penalty, taking into account
relevant facts about the culpability of the offender.45
As emphasized by the Graham Court, juveniles have
diminished culpability compared to adult offenders,
a fact that must be taken into account when examining the gravity of an offense.46 In addition, children
have a reduced ability to escape outside influences and
inner impulses once in a bad situation because of their
incomplete biological and mental development.47
A comparison of life without parole sentences
imposed on other offenders within Michigan shows
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that juveniles who receive the sentence are treated
disproportionately. Life without parole is the most
serious sentence that a Michigan offender can receive.48
In Michigan, a large proportion of juveniles sentenced
to life without parole committed felony murder or were
convicted as aiders and abetters.49 Yet under state law,
the same sentence will be given for youthful accomplices as for mature adults who commit premeditated
murder. 50
In Michigan, the second prong compares the
sentences imposed on other offenders in the same
jurisdiction, and the third prong compares sentences
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.51
On these, the sentence of life without parole for juveniles whose cases were directly filed into adult court
may be particularly vulnerable to challenge. Once a
charging decision has been made,52 if convicted, these
adolescents automatically receive life without parole,53
without the ability of a judge to ever consider the
maturity, potential for rehabilitation, circumstances of
the case, or culpability of the child.
The lack of discretion available in juvenile sentencing may also render the sentences imposed in this state
unusual when compared to other states. Less than 10
other states restrict discretion as severly as Michigan.54
Michigan’s complete denial of any individualized consideration of the youth by the court in being tried in
adult court and mandatory imposition of life without
the possibility of parole makes it an outlier among
the states. This results in a disproportionately high
number of juvenile life without parole sentences in
Michigan, and the imposition of the penalty in cases
where it would be unlikely for another state to impose
the penalty.55
Finally, Michigan requires an analysis of whether
the challenged sentence serves the goal of rehabilitation. 56 As emphasized by the Graham Court, life
without the possibility of parole for a juvenile completely eliminates any goal of rehabilitation.57 “From
a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate
the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”58 Further, most children
“age out” of criminal behavior.59
Even if non-rehabilitation goals are considered,
little to no additional purpose of punishment is
gained.60 “The case for retribution is not as strong
with a minor as with an adult” because of their



diminished culpability and maturity.61 Further, the
added deterrent effect of life without the possibility of parole on a juvenile is minimal, as “the same
characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than
adults suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible
to deterrence.”62 Lastly, public safety is not furthered
by incarcerating children after the danger they posed
has passed. In fact, as the Graham Court stated in the
nonhomicide context, the State’s “irrevocable judgment” about an adolescent’s value “is not appropriate
in light of a[n] . . . offender’s capacity for change and
limited moral culpability.”63
The Michigan Supreme Court has never ruled on
the constitutionality of life without parole for juveniles.64 The one published Michigan Court of Appeals
opinion on a juvenile life without parole sentence was
issued before Roper, and ruled on the previous juvenile
transfer system, in which a judge made a determination about whether or not the child should be sentenced as an adult.65 In fact, this determination was
integral to the Court’s analysis of the required factors
and its finding of constitutionality.66
Broader Lessons of Graham
Courts and advocates in Michigan can certainly
expect the impact of Graham to ripple for some time.
Most directly, advocates will likely be advancing
challenges to the sentence of life without parole for juveniles in Michigan. Less directly, Graham’s decision
provides instruction for all legal professionals working
with juvenile offenders.
Developmental Psychology and Neuroscience of
Adolescence in a Nutshell: What we can learn
from Graham making juvenile sentencing and
dispositional decisions.

The court, advocates for juveniles, and prosecutors
should make sure they are up-to-date on information
on adolescent development and neuroscience that
has influenced the Graham Court. The amicus briefs
in Graham from the American Medical Association,
et al67 and the American Psychological Association et
al68 discuss these ideas in more detail and are summarized here.
Developmental psychology and neuroscience
research confirm that juveniles, even those in late
adolescence, are less able to control their impulses
and exercise self-control,69are less capable of weighing
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risks and rewards, 70 and are less future-oriented and
able to take into account the consequences of their
actions.71 Mature judgment requires cognitive, social,
and emotional skills, and while late adolescents may
have logical reasoning ability, they “nonetheless lack
the abilities to exercise self-restraint, to weigh risk and
reward appropriately, and to envision the future that
are just as critical to mature judgment.”72
In addition to these individual immaturities, adolescents are particularly susceptible to the influences
of their environment and other people. Adolescents,
more than adults, commit crimes in groups, because
they want to conform to peer expectations and obtain
respect from others and cannot resist peer pressure,
the way an adult can.73
Additionally, a normal part of adolescence is engaging in risk-taking and criminal activity, which results, in part, from their lower capacity for judgment.
“‘[N]umerous . . . self-report studies have documented
that it is statistically aberrant to refrain from crime
during adolescence.’”74 Further, research shows that
the majority of youthful offenders will cease criminal activity.75 As the Roper Court said, it is “the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”76 Psychologists and psychiatrists, let alone
courts, cannot determine which youth will desist and
which youth will go on to commit future crimes.77
Modern neuroscience also shows differences
between adolescents and adults. MRI imaging has
permitted scientists to understand the human brain’s
progression from childhood through adolescence into
adulthood.78 In its brief, the American Medical Association explained:
In this regard, two complementary observations have been especially revealing. First, the
parts of the brain that work together to support the control of behavior, including the prefrontal cortex79 (which comprises roughly the
front third of the human brain) continue to
mature even through late adolescence.80 Second, in making behavioral choices, adolescents
rely more heavily than adults on systems and
areas of the brain that promote risk-taking and
sensation-seeking behavior. 81

6

Application of the science to effectively
communicate with juveniles

All parties who interact with juvenile defendants
know that communication with these persons can be
particularly challenging or frustrating. The challenge
is particularly daunting for attorneys representing
these juveniles. In discussing why the Court chose to
reject a case-by-case approach, the Graham court also
highlighted the difficulty of representing adolescents.
“[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults
also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles mistrust adults and have
limited understandings of the criminal justice system
and the roles of the institutional actors within it.
They are less likely than adults to work effectively with
their lawyers to aid in their defense.”82 The Court also
noted that juveniles’ difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences, impulsiveness and lack of trust “impair
the quality of a juvenile defendant’s representation.”83
Attorneys representing these adolescents are keenly
aware of this ethical and professional challenge. Attorneys must, “as far as reasonably possible, maintain a
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client” who
is impaired due to his age,84 including following the
duties to maintain client confidences85 and to abide
by the client’s decisions on the major choices in the
case, such as pleas, jury waiver and client testimony.86
Maintaining a normal client relationship is especially
difficult when parents, probation officers, or others do
not understand or appreciate the need for a vigorous,
confidential advocate for the accused adolescent.87
Make decisions based on full information
about the juvenile

As part of the inquiry into the sentencing or disposition of a juvenile (or in evaluating any challenges
to the constitutionality of a sentence of life without
parole), advocates and the court will need adequate
information about the particular juvenile offender.
Juvenile advocates may be familiar with information
about their client’s role in the offense and the offense
itself; however, fewer attorneys are adept at uncovering
information about the client himself. This investigation
must begin as soon as counsel is retained or appointed,
even if anticipated only in the sentencing or disposition
hearing, because some documents may take time to
obtain.
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Common sources of information include:
• School records, including individualize education programs (IEPs);
•

County Community Mental Health (CMH)
records;

•

Other service providers, including pediatricians,
therapists, counselors;

•

Juvenile court records, including information
on investigations and allegations of abuse and/
or neglect by the client’s parent(s).

Further, courts may need to provide funds for, or
obtain information from, an expert in order to give
thorough consideration to the constitutional challenge.88 Counsel for the juvenile may wish to apply
to the court for funds in order to obtain an expert to
evaluate a juvenile, obtain affidavits or testimony about
the client or about adolescent development, or other
unique aspects of the case.
Conclusion
While the narrowest holding of Graham may not
have a significant impact in Michigan, the ripples of
Graham, especially in terms of challenges to the sentence of life without parole for juveniles and the discussion of adolescent culpability, will extend throughout
Michigan. 
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